

**01998**

**1997/02/11**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Question Submitted for the Record by Representative Soloman to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
House International Relations Committee  
February 11, 1997

**China-Iran Cruise Missiles**

**Question:**

On June 19, 1996 Undersecretary Lynn Davis told the House International Relations Committee that there is "evidence" China has delivered C-802 cruise missiles to Iran.

- a. How many C-802 cruise missiles has China delivered to Iran and how many do we expect to delivered?
- b. Are any of these missiles in the hands of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy?
- c. Do we expect China to deliver land-based C-802 cruise missiles to Iran as well as ship-board missiles?
- d. How many American service men and women are potentially within the range of these missiles?
- e. Are these missiles also a threat to America's friends in the region?
- f. Did the China Aerospace Corporation or any of its affiliates such as China Precision Machinery Import-Export Company or China Great Wall Industry Group produce the C-802 missiles delivered to Iran?
- g. Did Poly Group or Polytechnologies broker or in any way facilitate the sale or delivery of C-802 or any other cruise missiles to Iran?
- h. The export of Chinese cruise missiles to Iran is a violation of the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, commonly known as the "Gore-McCain Act." When do you intend to enforce the law?

**UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

Answer:

(a, b, and c) It is a matter of public record that China has transferred a number of C-802 ship-based anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. The PRC has advertised a land-based version as well. Our responses must be constrained due to their unclassified nature. We would be happy to provide you further details in a classified setting.

(d and e) These missiles are roughly the equivalent of the French EXOCET missile that Iraq used in 1987 to attack the frigate USS Stark in the Gulf, killing 37 Americans. Since the missiles are a shipborne system, virtually any ship within the C-802's range is a potential target, including U.S. and allied shipping.

(f) China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) is the official trading company of Great China Wall Corporation, a ministry-level corporation under the State Council. CPMIEC is the logical originator of this system. ) || Pres ?

(g) We have no information to connect China Poly Group to this sale.

(h) The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 provides for the imposition of sanctions when a foreign person or country transfers goods or technology "so as to contribute knowingly and materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq ... to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of [certain] advanced conventional weapons."

Given that we know China transferred cruise missiles to Iran, we have focused our analysis on whether the transfers involved contributed materially to efforts by Iran to acquire "destabilizing numbers and types of advance conventional weapons." The Administration has concluded at present that the known transfers are not of a destabilizing number and type.

However, we will continue to monitor Chinese and Iranian activity for any additional transfers that might cross the threshold of sanctionable activity.

UNCLASSIFIED

Question for the Record Submitted by  
Representative Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
House International Relations Committee  
February 11, 1997

China-Iran Ballistic Missiles

Question 2a:

Does the Iranian ballistic missile program now under development pose a threat to American service men and women?

Answer:

- Yes. Iran's ballistic missile program poses a serious threat to American service men and women.

Question 2b:

What are the expected ranges and payloads of Iranian ballistic missiles now under development?

Answer:

- Iran is assembling Scud-B missiles which have a range of 300 km. and a payload of 1,000 kg.
- Iran is working to produce Scud-C missiles with a range of 500 km. and a smaller payload than the Scud-B. We also believe Iran is interested in developing even longer range missiles.

Question 2c:

Do we expect these Iranian ballistic missiles currently under development to have nuclear, chemical or biological warheads?

Answer:

- 
- Given Iran's persistent efforts to develop a nuclear, chemical and biological capability, we are concerned that Iran may use this capability to develop WMD warheads.

Question 2d:

Do Iranian ballistic missiles currently under development pose a threat to America's friends and allies in the region?

Answer:

- Yes. Iran's ballistic missile program also poses a threat to America's friends and allies in the region.

Question 2e:

Is the China Aerospace Corporation or any of its affiliates such as the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation associated with the Iranian ballistic missile program?

Answer:

- We cannot discuss this question at the unclassified level.

Question 2f:

Has Poly Group or Polytechnologies any association with the Iranian ballistic missile program? "Association" would include any role as agent, broker facilitator.

Answer:

- We have no information indicating that Poly Group, Polytechnologies or any of their affiliates, have been associated with Iran's ballistic missile program.

Question 2g:

Is any part of the Iranian Revolutionary guard associated with the Iranian ballistic missile program?

Answer:

- We have seen reports associating the Iranian Revolutionary Guard with various Iranian military weapons programs.

Question 2h:

Chinese assistance to the Iranian ballistic missile program would be a violation of Article 7 of the Arms Export control Act. When can we expect this legislation to be enforced?

Answer:

- The Administration is fully and faithfully implementing the law. We have been reviewing carefully the reports of transfers from China to Iran. We have not reached a conclusion that any of these reported transfers meet the specific legal requirements for triggering sanctions under U.S. law. Nevertheless, we are concerned about these reports. We will continue to monitor the situation closely.

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

CHINA-IRAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Question 3a:

On March 8, 1996 the Washington Post alleged that Chinese companies had shipped "virtually complete factories suited for making deadly poison gases" to Iran. Do Iranian chemical weapons pose a threat to American service men and women in the region?

Answer:

We are concerned about reports of transfers by Chinese entities of dual-use chemicals and equipment to Iran, and we continue to review carefully all such reports. We have raised our concerns with the highest levels of the Chinese government.

At the unclassified level, we cannot comment on the accuracy or inaccuracy of the Washington Post report.

Iranian chemical weapons pose a threat to American service men and women.

Iran poses the greatest threat to the stability of the Persian Gulf region and to U.S. interests. In the past, Iran has demonstrated both the will and the ability to use chemical weapons to defend national goals.

Iran's offensive chemical weapons program began in 1983 in response to Iraq's use of mustard gas against Iranian troops. By 1987, Iran was able to deliver limited quantities of blister (mustard) and blood (cyanide) agents against Iraqi troops using artillery shells. Iran has been producing chemical agents at a steadily increasing rate since 1984, and has weaponized some of these agents.

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

CHINA-IRAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Question 3b:

Do Iranian chemical weapons pose a threat to America's friends and allies in the region?

Answer:

Yes, Iran's chemical weapons pose a threat to American forces, as well as to our friends and allies in the region.

Iran poses the greatest threat to the stability of the region and to U.S. interests. In the past, Iran has demonstrated both the will and the ability to use chemical weapons to defend national goals.

Iran's offensive chemical weapons program began in 1983 in response to Iraq's use of mustard gas against Iranian troops. By 1987, Iran was able to deliver limited quantities of blister (mustard) and blood (cyanide) agents against Iraqi troops using artillery shells. Iran has been producing chemical agents at a steadily increasing rate since 1984, and has weaponized some of these agents.



-----  
Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

CHINA-IRAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Question 3c:

Has the China National Chemical Import-Export Corporation, aka "Sinochem," or any of its affiliates been associated with the shipment of dual-use equipment to Iran suitable for making poison gases?

Answer:

We have no information indicating that Sinochem, or any of its affiliates, have been associated with shipping dual-use equipment to Iran suitable for making chemical weapons.

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

CHINA-IRAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Question 3d:

If not Sinochem, which Chinese company transferred the dual-use chemical weapons goods to Iran?

Answer:

At the unclassified level, we cannot elaborate on the details of any such transfers.

- Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

CHINA-IRAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Question 3e:

Have PolyGroup, Polytechnologies or any of their affiliates been associated with the transfer of dual-use equipment to Iran suitable for making poison gases? "Transfer" would include role as agent, broker, or facilitator.

Answer:

We have no information indicating that PolyGroup, Polytechnologies, or any of their affiliates, have been associated with transferring any dual-use equipment or chemicals to Iran suitable for making chemical weapons.

-----  
Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

CHINA-IRAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Question 3f:

Has the Chinese Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) or any of its affiliates been associated with the transfer of dual-use equipment to Iran suitable for making poison gases? "Transfer" would include any role as agent, broker, or facilitator.

Answer:

We have no information indicating that COSTIND or any of its affiliates have been associated with transferring any dual-use equipment or chemicals to Iran suitable for making chemical weapons.

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

CHINA-IRAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Question 3g:

Is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard associated with the  
production of poison gases in Iran?

Answer:

At the unclassified level, we cannot elaborate on whether or  
not the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is involved in the  
production of chemical weapons in Iran.

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

CHINA-IRAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Question 3h:

Is there any indication that the Iranian Government has transferred or intends to transfer poison gases to sub-national terrorist groups?

Answer:

We have no information indicating that the Government of Iran has transferred, or intends to transfer, chemical weapons to sub-national terrorist groups. Naturally, given Iran's record of supporting terrorist groups, we are concerned about the potential for such transfers in the future.

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeline Albright  
February 11, 1997


CHINA-IRAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Question 3i:

Assistance to Iranian chemical weapons production would be a violation of Chapter 8 of the Arms Export Control Act. When can we expect this legislation to be enforced?

Answer:

The Administration is fully and faithfully implementing the law. We have been reviewing carefully the reports of transfers from China to Iran. We have not reached a conclusion that any of these reported transfers meet the specific legal requirements for triggering sanctions under this legislation. Nevertheless, we are concerned about these reports. We will continue to monitor the situation closely.



CHINA-IRAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

Question 4a:

Do Iranian biological warfare programs pose a threat to  
American service men and women in the region?

Answer:

Yes. It is likely that Iran possesses biological agents  
that pose a threat to US service personnel in the region.



CHINA-IRAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

Question 4b:

Do Iranian biological warfare programs pose a threat to  
America's friends and allies in the region?

Answer:

Yes. It is likely that Iran possesses biological agents  
that could be a threat to US friends and allies in the  
region.

CHINA-IRAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

Question 4c:

Has the China National Chemical Import-Export Corporation  
AKA "Sinochem" or any of its affiliates been associated with  
the transfer of dual use equipment to Iran suitable for the  
production of biological agents?

Answer:

No. To our knowledge neither this company nor its  
affiliates have been associated with the transfer of dual  
use equipment to Iran suitable for the production of  
biological agents.

CHINA-IRAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

Question 4d:

If not Sinochem or its affiliates, which Chinese company transferred the dual use biological warfare goods to Iran?

Answer:

At the unclassified level, we cannot elaborate on the details of any such transfers.

CHINA-IRAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

Question 4e:

Have Poly Group, Polytechnologies or any of their affiliates been associated with the transfer of dual-use equipment suitable for the production of biological agents? "Transfer" would include any role as agent, broker or facilitator.

Answer:

We have no information indicating that Poly Group, Polytechnologies or its affiliates have acted as agents, brokers or facilitators for the transfer of dual-use biological warfare goods to Iran.

CHINA-IRAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

Question 4f:

Has the Chinese Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) or any of its affiliates been associated with the transfer of dual-use equipment suitable for the production of biological agents? "Transfer" would include any role as agent, broker or facilitator.

Answer:

We have no information indicating that COSTIND or its affiliates have been associated with the transfer to Iran of dual-use equipment suitable for the production of biological agents.

CHINA-IRAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

Question 4h:

Is there any indication that the Iranian Government has transferred or intends to transfer biological agents to sub-national terrorist groups?

Answer:

We have no information indicating that the Government of Iran has transferred, or intends to transfer, biological agents to sub-national terrorist groups. Naturally, given Iran's record of supporting terrorist groups, we are concerned about the potential for such transfers in the future.

CHINA-IRAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright  
February 11, 1997

Question 4i:

Assistance to the Iranian biological warfare program would be in violation of Chapter 8 of the Arms Export Control Act. When can we expect this legislation to be enforced?

Answer:

The Administration is fully and faithfully implementing the law. We have been reviewing carefully the reports of transfers from China to Iran. We have not reached a conclusion that any of these reported transfers meet the specific legal requirements for triggering sanctions under U.S. law. Nevertheless, we are concerned about these reports. We will continue to monitor the situation closely.

### China-Iran-Syria Advanced Cruise Missiles

#### Questions 2a - 2f:

2a: Is this program a threat to American service men and women?

2b: Is this program a threat to America's friends and allies in the region?

2c: Has the China Aerospace Corporation or any of its affiliates been associated with this program?

2d: Have Poly Group, Polytechnologies or any of their affiliates been associated with this program?

2e: Has the China Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) or any of its affiliates been associated with this program?

2f: Is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard associated with this program?

#### Answer:

- We are not aware of any information that China, Iran and Syria are cooperating on an advanced cruise missile system.